SOCIALIST APPEAL
An Organ of Revolutionary Socialism
Published Monthly by Socialist A ppeal, Eoo™ 719-35 S. Dearborn St.. Chicago, HI.
Vol. II.— No. 11
Subscription: One dollar for 24
issues
Editorials :
Felix Morrow :
Arne Swabeck:
CONTEXTS
Lessons of the Election 1
P.O.U.M. and the Spanish"
Revolution ..... 5 q Crane:
Arms for Spanish Workers.... 6 Albert Goldman-
Reactionaries Triumph —
Only in Tampa ]0
C.I.O. and Steel Workers ...\2
Toward Socialist Clarity 13
Lessons of the Eleetion
I
1. Democratic Landslide
IT IS admitted by all shades of opinion here and abroad
* that the predominating feature of the elections was the
unprecedented electoral vote for Roosevelt. The Popular
Front for the Democratic candidate em.braced virtually
the entire working class, W.P.A.er's and P.W.A.er's, and
the Negroes on_ the left, a large part of the farmers,
professional, white-collar and other middle-class groups
as well as a significant section of monopoly capital itself.
For better or for worse, for one reason or another, the
hopes of 26 millions-from the most exploited to the top-
most exploiters-were focussed in some degree upon the
Squire of Hyde Park.
The causes of Roosevelt's victory are not difficult to
discern. The fundamental reason for his return to office
is to be found in the sustained speculative and industrial
boorn^ that kept swelling during the campaign and mounted
to higher levels upon the news of his reelection. Just
as Roosevelt was the beneficiary of the depression in
1932, so he reaped the political harvest of the boom
in 1936.
Their hopes revived, their fears diminished, or their
appetites_ whetted by the rising tide of prosperity, the
twenty-six millions looked to Roosevelt to lead them
farther out of the desert, in which they were wandering
m 1932,' into green pastures. The masses appreciate bold
and determined leadership, and, whatever one's opinion
about the direction and quality of Roosevelt's regime, in
contrast to Hoover's do-nothing policy, he did provide
tliat in the first critical months of his administration.
the enormous vote of the electorate paid unconscious
tribute to that fact.
There were, however, far more material reasons for
Roosevelt's victory. The desire of Farley's henchmen to
keep or get jobs; the propaganda and pressure of the labor
leaders, aided by the Old Guard and the Communist party,
to line up the labor vote for Roosevelt; the administrative
pressure upon the unemployed and farmers on the relief
roils; the fear that their doles might be discontinued;
the refinancing aid and subsidies given to farmers and
home-owners ; these and similar powerful political and
economic pressure contributed to swell the vote for Roo-
sevelt.
■But why, in view of the rabid campaign in the conser-
vative press against the "Democratic Dictator," did
niagnates like Owen D. Young, A. P. Giannini, Walter
beagle, and many others back Roosevelt? The answer
was given by the NEW YORK TIMES in its editorial
captioned, "A Reasoned Choice," which presented "three
dommant considerations why the public welfare will best
be served by the continuance of the Democratic party
m power and by the re-election of the President " (Note
that unlike the labor fakers the TIMES places the Demo-
cratic party first and its chief second.)
First: "Mr. Roosevelt is a keen enough judge of
public opinion to make his second administration more
conservative than his first." That is to say: the crisis is
over and with it the radical phase of the Roosevelt
regime. Now that prosperity is at hand, and the Supreme
Court has killed the AAA and NRA, "products of the
panic period," the time has come to consoHdate the gains
made and not embark on any more un-American ex-
periments. Second : "in a very fundamental way the
President's reelection will provide insurance against
radicahsm of the sort which the United States has most
to fear." The period ahead, despite the return of pros-
perity, is not going to be one of civil peace, as some
optimists imagine, but of industrial strife, relief riots,
and a growth of radicalism. Roosevelt has shown that
he is capable of handling such problems to the satisfac-
tion of the most enlightened capitalists. Finally, and most
important of all, Roosevelt's foreign policy is preferable
to the "narrow nationalism" of the Repubhcan party,
preferable that is, to that part of finance capital which
wants tariffs lowered in certain cases and a firm ar-
mament and imperialist policy in all cases.
These arguments for supporting Roosevelt are infinitely
more correct than the corresponding rationalizations of
the labor leaders, liberals, and Stalinists. The NEW
YORK TIMES, hke its London and Paris counterparts,
is the authentic voice of the big bourgeoisie. When the
TIMES uses the editorial "we," it speaks for the rulers
of America, who in turn look to their chief organ for
political guidance and information. The editorial staff
of the TIMES has to know — and with its access to all
avenues of private and public, national and international
information does know — -who's who and what's what. We
submit that, next to Roosevelt's speech in defense of
capitalism, the TIMES editorial was the most important
political document issued during the campaign.
2. The Republican Rout
Although Landon was buried under an avalanche of
electoral votes, it must be remembered that he received
more votes than any other Republican presidential can-
didate and approximately forty percent of the total cast.
The Republican vote signifies that more than fifteen mil-
SOCIALIST APPEAL
lion people are opposed even to the mild reform program
of the New Deal, required to adapt the capitalist regime
to the conditions of the crisis. This is a cohesive conser-
vative bloc of formidable proportions.
The Republican standpatters presented no positive pro-
gram but contented themselves with a purely negative
criticism of the New Deal. Such a tactic can be success-
ful, as Roosevelt demonstrated in 1932, only if the decisive
masses of the electorate are thoroughly disgusted and
disillusioned with the existing order. Such was not the
case this year. At bottom, the Republicans were defeated
by the boom.
A noticeable feature was the almost total lack of labor
support in the Republican camp. Only a few petrified
reactionaries like Hutcheson, czar of the Carpenter's
Union, dared display themselves under the reactionary
Republican banner in 1936 where even John L. Lewis
stood eight years before.
3. The Union Part:^ Fade-Out
The small vote cast for the Coughlin-Smith-Townsend
candidate, Lemke, dealt a fatal blow to that hastily-im-
provised demagogic movement aimed at the dissatisfied
sections of the middle classes. Gagged by the Church
which dispatched Cardinal Pacelli from Rome to make
peace with Roosevelt, Coughlin has temporarily retired
from the political stage, shouting that he has been be-
trayed, like Jesus, by millions of his disciples, who pledged
to follow his guidance. The National Union for Social
Justice is to be disbanded. Meanwhile, Huey Long's
successor, Gerald K. Smith, continues to fish in troubled
waters for suckers to join or subsidize his fascistic move-
ment.
Although the germ's of Fascism are latent in our social
system, the conditions are not yet ripe for the growth
of the malignant mass movement in this country. The
social crisis of 1929-1932 has been temporarity overcome.
Hope and not fear is the pervasive mood among the
masses. The working class, safely harnessed to Roose-
velt's triumphal chariot by Lewis and his colleagues, is
not yet threatening to overturn the existing order.
The Republican rout and the Union party fade-out, each
in its own way, proves the utter falsity of the Communist
contention that fascism or semi-fascist reaction was the
main danger in 1936. Even intelligent liberal reporters
like Paul Ward and others on the NATION flatly assert-
ed before election that neither had any chance of defeat-
mg Roosevelt. The result completely confirmed the
revolutionary Socialist position that the Stalinists had in-
vented a scarecrow out of the Landon-Hearst-Liberty
League-Lemke combmation in order to dupe and frighten
''lesser° evil "'^ '"^° ^°*'"^ ^°' *^^ ^^^^^o^ratic party as the
4. The Stalinist "Victor^"
. The Communist press can, and does, claim a victorv
a" n"co?tT'?"lut i^'^^ ^"^P^^^t-^ '^ ^^^^^-*'"^ LTndo'n
and hey are lost Ww' Pyrrhic victory ; another such
^^^ at ^a;ltt"^ch:raTer;T th"' '"^'^'^^' ^'^^
demoralized the^r mfmberf rnralienltermanTS^l^^
sympathizers. Doubtless
active part in the ca
confusion
their position.
- s.a,i„i„ could ^zzi^:^:;T;„ritx. """""^
every comrade who took an
mpaign can cite cases of the utter
•' To^vo^e ?' .?^^;"'-^* ^-^^ concerni^';
lovote for the John Brown of Kansa!
But the results gave the answer. Why did the Cp!
noil such an astonishingly small vote m their strongholri"'
New York? The Stalinists expected for the first timJ
tn exceed the Socialist vote; one prominent Stalinist rr>„
fided to Norman Thomas that he expected 250,000 vote*
in New York. But when the votes were counted Thom^!
had 70,000, Laidler 80,000; while both Browder and Min
had less than the 50,000 needed to keep them on the ballot
norl
•homasi
York"city "ajid "the 60,000^ for Amter, the Communist can.
The discrepancy between Browder's 32,000 votes in N
ewl
didate for Board of Alderman, shows where the Com J
munist vote went. The Stalinists lost their votes to the
Democrats, the A.L.P., and, according to the N.Y. TlMl
and SUN, also to the Socialists, "because many formed
followers of the Communist Party considered the neW
Communist line to be opportunistic." Thanks to theij
propaganda and instruction as well as the harsh electorafl
restrictions upon minority parties, the C.P. succeeded ia
double-crossing itself off the ballot.
Although the Stalinists have tried to save their facej
by claiming a victory, in reality they emerged from the
campaign with a black eye. Although they mobilized far
greater forces and resources than the Socialists couli
command, they lacked the one essential ingredient, a con-
sistent political line. (The debacle of the Stalinists con-
tains this lesson for every Socialist.) A party that is J
unable to stand upon its own feet and its own program
is already far along on the road to liquidation.
5. Labor s LoVe Lost
An even more instructive aspect of the campaign was
the work of Labor's "Non-Partisan" League and its Em-
pire State offspring, the American Labor party. This
election gave American Sociahsts their first opportunity
to see a labor party setup in action on the American
political arena. 1936 foreshadowed the shape of things
to come.
More than any other organization next to the Demo-
cratic Committee itself. Labor's "Non-Partisan" league
was responsible for the Roosevelt sweep. In the key in-
dustrial states, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan and elsewhere, the hard-riding range-
bosses of the C.I.O. used every possible means of pressure
and propaganda to corral the labor vote for Roosevelt—
and, lest we forget, Garner.
In many states Labor's Non-Partisan League was part
and parcel of the Democratic machine. In New York,
however, where Tammany has a hundred and f.fty years
old franchise, the Lewisites assumed a separate name and
apparatus, although they pursued the same policy— and
methods. The American Labor party recruited into its
ranks about 250,000 trade unionists, received about
250,000 votes ; and collected about 250,000 dollars. It has
therefore about three times the organizational strength
of the Socialist party.
Let us look at its record. First, it unconditionally
endorsed three capitalist candidates and stumped for
them. Second, it presented no demands of its own
to the President or Governor. When New York Sociahst
trade-unionists demanded that Dubinsky and Hillman at
least request Lehman to liberate the four labor political
prisoners in Sing-Sing as part payment for their support,
the labor bureaucrats together with the Stalinist leaders
quashed the attempt. They raised no slogans of their
own and stifled any efforts to criticize the Democratic
candidates. In every sense of the word, these labor lieu-
tenants acted as the flunkeys of the capitalist class. -1
can understand the motives of a man who sells his vote
tor two dollars, said Norman Thomas, but who can respect
people like Dubinsky who give everything for nothing,
nay, even pay for the privilege!
4
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Labors Non-Partisan League played a thorouKhlv
reactionary role in this campaign. In depicting the author
of the "merit clause as the friend of labor, it facilitated
Roosevelt s strike-strangling activities in the future In
hailing the billion-dollar war budget chief as a peace-
lover, they aid the ideological preparation to line up labor
on the side of American imperialism in the comin<r con-
flict. In concentrating their criticism upon the Republi-
cans, who have little power, they shield the equally reac-
tionary Democrats who hold power in most states and
above all at Washington. In drawing class-conscious
workers away from the Socialist party, by the false and
fatal argument of choosing "the lesser evil," they retard
the revolutionary political education of the vanguard of
American labor. Such is the first page in the history of
the labor party movement in the Umted States.
The local labor and farmer-labor setups that sprouted
here and there throughout the country mostly under
C.P. sponsorship died aborning. All these tender saplings
were uprooted by the Roosevelt hurricane. So much for
the C.P. insistence that the American masses were de-
manding above all things in 1936 a "genuine mass-class
farmer-labor party" to "save them from war and Fasc-
ism, and promote peace, progress, and prosperity." They
got it but under the familiar shopkeeper's sign of the
Democratic party. The professional politicians of the
established Farmer-Labor machines in Minnesota and
Wisconsin who made their peace with Roosevelt were
allowed to reign in their little Iberian villages on condi-
tion that they supported Caesar at Rome.
The Old Guard organizations in Bridgeport and Read-
ing which broke away from the S.P. at the beginning of
the campaign suffered a cruel fate. McLevy's five sales-
tax stalwarts in the Connecticut legislature were replaced
by deserving Democrats and a like disaster was inflicted
upon the Reading representatives. Even the split with
the Socialist party could not save the offices the muni-
cipal Socialists valued above pearls, rubies, and principles.
6. The Socialist Campaign
The Socialist party waged a valiant and honorable
struggle against great odds and terrific pressure in the
1936 campaign. Despite splits and betrayals, slanders
and attacks from the Old Guard, the Stalinists, and the
Lewisites, our party alone among the labor parties held
aloft the banner of Socialism and took a definite class
position on the other basic issue confronting the American
masses today, the war question. Many details of the
condiict of the campaign can and ought to be severely
criticized; but to ingore the central facts would be to
throw out the baby with the bath.
On the credit side of the ledger we can also register
the heartening vote in New York. The bloc of >0-80
thousand votes is a mass base for the further growth
of the party in this key state. The Madison Square
Garden meeting showed the youthful vitality and militant
spirit of the party at its best. Despite a late start, the
work among the intellectuals carried on by the Thomas-
■Nelson Independent Committee demonstrated that the
revolutionary changes within the S.P. have already at-
tracted many leading intellectuals formerly sympathetic
to the C.P. and will, if carried through consistently, win
away many more in the near future.
On the debit side must be recorded the small national
vote. The complex causes for the drop cannot be ex-
amined here but they should furnish plenty of food for
•"etlection in the months to come. The scanty success
O' the Thomas-Nelson Labor Committee indicated that
the party must begin to build from the ground up in
the trade-union field by means of Socialist fractions.
A black spot upon the record was the failure of the
SOCl'ALIST CALL to functir
tional campaign organ oT^h ;"paTtv'''i?i':'T ^1 '""^ ^
campaig^") ¥he CAl T 1. T , ^^t^ '* ^^'^ ^l"'"'"'? thi
boni. h stead of drninl'?, ^T:^ '^'■"'" ^"^ ^ b^^k-
ting the Hhnr °:^^'=^''"g ^^'th all the vital issues agita-
ar/so iaH t posSn7-= distinguishing the revolufion-
giving a clllr ZlT T ^^""^ ^^ °ther parties; and
and fally symnlei^r' '"^ ''"' *° ^"'^^ ^^e comrades
the CALL eVuivSed T '■', l^ *'^^ Socialist cause,
A„ „:_ _. ^51".'vocated, or avoided definite commitments.
abstraction from
livinc
-.V <^^ia^Kii oi our opponents the TAT r ^u "*"'.--" "s
them. These ostrirh +. f ^"f , V^^^- chose to ignore
arouse the enthusiasm n'?, ^°"^^' ^^''^''y '^^ expected to
does not interest The n .' ^f'^ members-and what
The root of the flabbiness of the CALL lay in its lack
of political clarity and consistency. This in turn reflected
the confusion within the party as a whole. But this is a
question to consider and solve elsewhere.
With all these reservations and criticisms, the balance-
sheet of the campaign showed a considerable net gain
of political credit and prestige for the party, despite the
tremendous drop in its vote, which can be converted into
coin in the future provided the party continues along the
road of revolutionary Socialism.
With one noteworthy exception, the reception of the re-
sults in the chief world capitals was a replica on an in-
ternational scale of the reception within the United
States. Just as almost every political tendency here
saw in Roosevelt only that aspect most pleasing to them,
so foreign officials stressed that aspect of his victory
most favorable to their viewpoint. Conservative, labor
and liberal England saw in it the vindication of the
method of Anglo-Saxon democracy; Rome and Berlin
saw in the Democratic sweep the triumph of the "leader-
ship principle"; Moscow saw in it an aid to peace since
Roosevelt is supposed to be a better friend of the Soviet
Union than Landon — or the international working class.
This universal flattery expressed the desire of the second-
rate powers to be on friendly terms with the capitalist
colossus and its chief, especially in view of the conflicts
ahead.
President Roosevelt also received a cable of congratula-
tions from Leon Blum, head of the Socialist party of
France, saluting his victory as a triumph of democracy.
This was a purely gratuitous political action on Blum's
part. There was no official reason why, as Premier of the
Popular Front Cabinet, Blum had to congratulate the
head of the American Popular Front cabinet. (That is
the function of the President of the French Republic,
who exists for but two other purposes : to act as figure
head at official functions — and to be assassinated per-
iodically.) In view of the intransigent opposition of the
American Socialist party to Roosevelt and his policies
in the campaign, Blum's action can only be interpreted as
a direct and premeditated slap in the face to our party.
Blum's attitude reflects the general attitude of the Labor
and Socialist International.
7. Some Political Perspectives
Given this analysis of the election results, what can be
forecast for the immediate future? The character of
the second Roosevelt administration has in our opinion,
been correctly predicted by the TIMES: it will beconie
increasingly conservative. Why not? Although Labor s
Non-Partisan League leaders are responsible for Roo-
sevelt he is not responsible to them. He has given no
SOCIALIST APPEAL
specific pledges to labor, or for that matter to any other
group Thanks to the scope of his victory, Roosevelt
IS free to take the next steps in "consolidating the gains
of his administration." .
'•No one in the United States," he proudly proclaimed
on October 23rd. "believes more firmly than in the sys-
tem of private business, private property, and private
profits." And no one, let us add, is readier to act more
firmly to protect its interests.
Securely installed in office, Roosevelt will be more and
more inclined to make peace with the masters of capital
by balancing the budget, decreasing taxes, placating the
power trust, etc. Simultaneously he will turn his back
upon the unemployed, cutting down relief and repressing
militant actions on the part of workers and unemployed.
His administration will speed up military preparations.
Continued concessions to his right, pretty phrases, pro-
mises, and repressive measures to the left : such is the
most hkely policy of the administration. Already three
weeks after election 40,000 employed on W.P.A. are being
laid off in New York.
The huge size of the Democratic majority is mislead-
ing. The Democratic party is today unwieldy and heter-
ogeneous, composed of incompatible elements which must
sooner or later collide, not only with each other, but
with the President's policies. Roosevelt cannot at one
and the same time satisfy the bankers and business men
by lowering taxes and balancing the budget and keep the
unemployed on the relief rolls at their present status.
He cannot in critical strike situations play ball with both
bosses and workers for an extended period. The mul-
titude of frictions within the Democratic camp must lead
to its disintegration on both the right and the left. The
walkout of Smith and Davis was but an anticipation ; and,
as left-wing labor's discontent and disillusion with the
Democrats increase, as they must, it will not be so easy
to hold the rank-and-file in line.
It will not be the first time in American history that
the height of the organizational strength of the Demo-
cratic party coincided with the beginning of its decline.
In 1836 Van Buren, like Roosevelt, was swept into office
during a period of prosperity. By 1840 the Democratic
party was split into four parts and the Whigs took over
the government. To be sure, the panic of 1837 intervened
— but who will guarantee that the next four years of
the Roosevelt regime will be without catastrophic political
or economic crises?
Those who predict the death and disappearance of the
Grand Old party are burying a lively corpse. Not only
is the Republican party still supported by forty percent
of the electorate, as we have pointed out, but it has a
genuine political reason for existence: it is by tradition
and capacity the most direct and dependable political
representative of the ruling class in our society Like
a seasoned actor, ousted by his former understudy the
Grand Old party is but waiting in the wings, hoping that
the leading man now in the spot-light will break his neck
so that he can replace him as of yore, A new' crisis will
again put the Repubhcans in a position to make a rea
bidforpower But at also holds real dangers. For the
next crisis will g,ve a powerful impetus to fhe resurgence
of radica petty-bourgeois movements of the CouS
lZ^Z"u' ^'"^^' """^'^' ^^^' ^^^n ™ore afarmingfy to
pretext and an excuse for hastening its dissolution.
Nevertheless, Socialists must be prepared for an over-
night shift in C.P. policy in case of a sudden change in
the field of world politics (rupture of the I'ranco- Soviet
pact the Spanish crisis, etc.). The dissatisfaction ac-
cumulating within the C.P., combined with the advance
of the ideas of revolutionary socialism within the S.p.
will enable us to recruit more rapidly from C.P. ranks in
the future. In this way we will assist the Stalinists in
carrying through the work of liquidation which they have
so efficiently begun in the past year.
The future of the American Labor party movement
remains ambiguous. 1936 was a dress-rehearsal for Lewis
and his associates and indicates to a considerable degree
what kind of political roles they may be expected to play
in the days before us. Three roads open before them.
First, to continue as the spare wheel iri the Democratic
chariot and to support the Democratic crown prince,
Earle of Pennsylvania, in 1940 as they did F.D.R. in 1936.
Second, to strike out as an independent political machine.
Third, to be still-born. It is not at all excluded that a
labor party on the English and Belgium models may
never flourish for any period in the United States. It is
not written in any divine decree that the American work-
ers who come to political maturity in an epoch of wars
and revolutions are obliged to repeat all the stages of
development — and errors—of their Old World brethren.
It is the main task of the revolutionary vanguard to
shorten mass reformist developments by their activity
and propaganda ; and here we conclude upon the most im-
portant of all questions for the future : the course of our
own party. The powerful impulse within labor's ranks
for militant, independent political action was stifled in
1936 by Labor's Non-Partisan League and its allies. How
can revolutionary socialism best revive, strengthen, and
direct that impulse into the most progressive channels?
The results of the elections demonstrated in our opinion
that the prime source of the strength of the S.P. lay in
its political position and program. Our opponents had
greater resources and forces, and yet, it was they, and not
we, who were on the defensive during the campaign.
I'n our judgment the Socialist party can progress
along only one road, the revolutionary road. The circum-
stances in which we operate do not allow us any other
choice, even if we should care to take it. The S.P. must
become the revolutionary party of the American w^orking
class, or it will perish ignobly. The S.P. cannot compete
with stronger and more firmly established organizations
like the A.L.P. and the C.P. on a reformist basis — what-
ever reservations are privately rrtade. Those who seek
reformist policies, will go to the manufacturers and
merchants of the most unadulterated brands.
Conversely, the leftward moving radical workers will
go where the revolutionary banner is most proudly and
clearly displayed. To exist, to grow, to reap the harvest
of the_ inevitable disillusion of the most progressive work-
ers with Roosevelt and his call-boys, and to become, in
reality as well as in intention, the revolutionary vanguard
of American labor, our party must first of all formulate
and adopt a clear, and consistent program along revolu-
tionary Socialist lines, that will distinguish it unmistak-
ably from all others on the American scene. Upon the
foundation of these principles, the party in common work
and discussion must elaborate a concrete program of ac-
tion that will enable us to penetrate deeper into the mass
The Communist party, on the other hand r,.^ ir.„ u organizations in every field and to beco'me, not only the
any real political or organizational reasons for^-nH^r"^^! ""^^'^^"^ ^'^^d^'-^ °f the advanced workers in their daily
existence
igencies of the f"ore
Long .epS„de„-.7o7-iS"p°„lfci'e°; o'Thf'"'
ex-
i^a P i^;^ S7^"^'^ '' ^he Soviet b^^e^u^r^^
liquidLion' ToSy'Ihe CpIrL'*.^ ^°"^P^^^^ -^ f-ai
y tne C.P. IS hunting everywhere for a
struggles, but their guides in showing them' the only way
out of the Inferno of capitalism.
Such to our mind is the principal lesson of the 1936
elections for revolutionary socialists. The time is at hand
to draw all the necessary practical conclusions from it.
I
I
SOCIALIST APPEAL
I
P.O.U.M. and the Spanish Revolution
IS
i TRAGIC aspect of the Spanish revolution that
A frequentiv obscured by the emphasis on the faihxre
of the Socialist and Communist leaders, i^s the role plajed
by the/.O.U.M., the —
cation "
'Workers Party of Marxian bniti-
of
I
Many placed ^reat hopes in the P.O.U.M in the period
nrecedin- the outbreak of the civil war and these hopes
werf^n'^^ained bv the belief that the defects ni the pohcy
id leadership of this party would be burned out like so
inuch dross in the crucible of the conflict itself. The party
Md rejected the social reformism of the Second Interna-
tional It had broken with the bureaucratic centnsm
the Third International. It had in its ranks men and
'n^men associated with the best revolutionary Marxian
traditions in Spain. Many were and are the aspects of its
pro-ram and activity which placed this party at the left
win? of the organized labor movement of Spain, and
above all of its industrial heart, Catalonia.
The passage of week after Aveek of the civil war, how-
ever cannot but have proved disillusioning insofar as
these hopes are concerned. Tlie present leadership of the
P.O.U.M. has, thus far, at least, proved incapable of rising
to the stature which a bold Marxian leadership would
attain under circumstances so highly favorable to the
working class as those at hand in Spain today. The
social democrats and Stalinists are the frankly avowed
barriers on the road to the proletarian revolution in
Spain. Both of them formally forbid the workers to play
an independent class role or to aspire to an independent
class goal. Bourgeois democracj^ they proclaim, is all
you are now allowed to strive towards ; Avhoever tells the
working class to fight for its own power, for the rule of
labor, for socialism, is — a provocateur and an agent of
Franco (or Hitler, or Hearst).
Yet the P.O.U.M. leadership, which opposes these two
parties, cannot rightly claim a sufficient superiority to
them to warrant the title of genuine leadership of the
proletariat. Precisely because it knew better in the past,
precisely because more was and should have been ex-
pected of it, its present line of conduct is all the more
reprehensible and disastrous. What it is doing and what
it is failing to do, show that in a critical situation the
half-way measures and half-way policies characteristic
of all species of Centrism, have a natural habit of wreak-
ing havoc on the cause of socialism.
The P.O.U.M. sailed along for a lengthy period with
the "socialist democratic revolution" as the main slogan
on its masthead. Did this mean the fight for "demo-
cracy" (and if so, for whom?) or for socialism? Or did
it mean both? The answer proved to be the one that life
has given to such confusion in the past : it meant neither.
The criticism of its ambiguities made by the consistent
Marxists, was met by the P.O.U.M. leadership with a
contemptuous shrug of the shoulders in the direction of
the "sectarians."
But these ambiguities led the P.O.U.M. heads right into
the camp of People's Frontism — that marvelous invention
for canalizing the independent labor movement back under
the control of the "democratic" bourgeoisie. In the
February elections, when both S.P. and C.P. sold their
birthright of independence for a mess of parliamentary
seats doled out to them by the bourgeois politicians, the
P.O.U.M. ended by joining the People's Front and signing
its name to the bourgeois platform. For the sake of
momentary "popularity" {and a seat in parliament), the
Ed'iiorial Slalemenl
P.O.U.M. robbed itself of a great moral authority in com-
batting People's Frontism in the ranks of labor. Later
events showed that its "lapse" was not accidental or
momentary.
In the civil war, the P.O.U.M. membership and leader-
ship has fought with exemplary bravery and determina-
tion. Many are its warriors cut down by Fascist machine-
guns. The party's leader, Joaquin Maurin, also fell at the
front, a proletarian hero. But courage and determination
alone do not suffice, as was shown by the Austrian Soc-
ialist leaders in 1934, and by the social democratic and
Stalinist leaders in Spain today. In the decisive question
of policy, the P.O.U.M. leadership has played an intoler-
able and indefensible role, particularly in Catalonia, the
seat of the party's strength.
It is there that the new workers' power was first or-
ganized. It was there, at the outbreak of the civil war,
that the workers spontaneously armed, took over factor-
ies, banks, land, and means of transportation, and or-
ganized their own organs of power with which to control
and administer what they had taken over. By the side of
the old bourgeois power, they had set up the workers'
power — a bristling challenge to the old order and a
guarantee (the only effective guarantee) of the aew.
In the Russia of 1917, this situation came to be known
as the "dual power" — the only possible organized social-
ist challenge of the working class to their old, masters.
The bourgeoisie, in such a situation, can restore its old
power only by rapidly or gradually dissolving or (as they
did in Germany and Austria in 1918-1919) "absorbing"
and negating the "dual" power of the proleratiat. Who-
ever helps them.1 in this to any extent is a traitor to the
revolution.
Yet this process of "absorbing" the dual power, of
devitalizing it, is just what is taking place now m Cata-
lonia The P.O.U.M. leadership, does not resist this pro-
cess Its representative, Nin, despite opposition^ in the
P.O.U.M. ranks, has entered as Minister of Justice mt©
the coalition government of the bourgeois
whose role it is to defend "democracy."
decrees are merely a grudging approval to measures al-
ready taken independently by the workers,
decrees mean nothing when the only guarantee of the
socialist future lies in the preservation and extension ot
the power of the independent working class organs, the
Catalonian equivalent of the Russian workers and
peasants' Soviets. These organs are now being gi-adualty
crushed, at first by being subordinated to the old (that
is the bourgeois) state machinery. That reactionary,
Generality,
Its "socialist"
But these
anti-revolutionary process against which Marx and Lenin
warned so eloquently in their time, is openly justified by
the P.O.U.M. chiefs.
"It is evident from this short description of eonfused
responsibility," they write, "that the period of dual power,
so essential in the pre-revolutionary and early revolution-
ary phases, had outlived its usefulness and was leading
to confusion and needless duplication." (The SPANISH
REVOLUTION, Oct. 28, 1936).
Therefore? Dissolve the bourgeois government of the
Generality, the old state machinery, which is "■needlessly-
duplicating" the government of Anti-Fascist Militia? A
Marxist would think so, but not the P.O.U.M. spokesmen.
"In its last sesion on October 1, the Central Anti-Fascist
Militia Committee decided to disband, thus giving its
sanction to the new Council of the Generality." (Ibid.)
i
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Thus are the Catalonian workers' councns g^.tted^^
as the German Workers' Councils °J,. 1^^^, ^^ /'"^s
L^orporated into the Wei-, ^
rc"h^rfnuert; prod^^^^^^^^
RevolutTon not Bour-eois Democracy"; assistnig also it
S,es w ho'ut saying, are the social democrats and Stalm-
fsts- among thenx, too, the doctrinaire anarchist leaders
who have turned a new, and very respectable leaf.
^ * * *
It is not excluded that, despite this lamentable I'ecord
.),; POUM will vet succeed in redressmg its course
Ind becoming the rallying ground of the truly consistent
revolut onar; movement in Spain, or at least, a great
contribution towards such a movement. But this presup-
posed a drastic revision of its present course. ^_
The Stalinists, in their own way, are trying to revise '
the POUM Criminal— and horrible to contemplate— are
the hooligan raids on P.O.U.M headquarters by armed
Stalinists as well as the recent Stahnist demand for out-
law n^ the P.O.U.M. press as "counter-revolutionary." If
the term applies at all, it applies of course to Staling
Spanish agents. We have no such contemptible and
characteristically Stalinist "revision" in mind, it goes with-
out saying But unless the P.O.U.M. takes measures to
alter its position in favor of that line of policy which
made possible the victory of the Russian working class
in October 1917, it will pass into history as the incarnation
of disappointed hopes.
Arms for the Spanish Workers 1
Ont:p the International Worhin^dass
^ill Send Arms
BY FELIX MORROW
H
ITLER and MussoTini s recognition of Franco's forces
means that two of the most powerful capitalist gov-
ernments of Europe have irrevocably tied their fate to
that of Spanish capitalism. The decisive defeat of Franco
now can only mean, at the very least, a defeat to the
prestige of Berlin and Rome such as has never been
accepted by a capitalist government without resort to war.
It must be said in passing that Hitler and Mussolini
have so far played their cards very well indeed. But only
with the aid of French and British capitalism and of
Stalin. For not even the adventurous capitalists of Italy
and Germany would have dared this move earlier in the
game. Had Spain, in accordance with the traditional
rules of international law which naturally favor establish-
ed governments, been able to purchase arms in the first
weeks of the rebellion, Franco — whose original strategy
was shattered when the proletariat of the chief cities
overpowered the garrisons — would have long ago been
defeated. The Soviet Union's acceptance of the non-in-
tervention pact was a blow against the Spanish workers
as even the Stalinist press in Spain which, as the Spaniard
says, is on the same side of the barrier as the bull and
therefore cannot be as philosophical as the DAILY
WORKER, had to admit. I'n the first three months of
the_ civil war no arms at all arrived from the Soviet
Union and, of course, nothing to this day arrives with
the consent of the French and British governments,
i hereby Franco, with aid from! Italy and Germany, was
enabled to occupy sufficient territory which, coupled with
the non-intervention pact's placing of Burgos and Madrid
on an equal plane, now enables official recognition with
complete impunity.
If -We stigmatize the crime which the Stalin regime
committed against the Spanish proletariat, it is not for
the sake of mere recrimination, but to emphasize as
solemnly as we can the fundamental task of today and
tomorrow :
Hitler and Mussolini's open alliance with Franco means
that the struggle for Spain can now only be won on the
international arena. The Spanish proletariat is lost with-
out the decisive intervention of international aid.
The onl:g International AidvDill come ^
from the Proletariat
N ABSOLUTE pre-condition of effective international
aid for the Spanish workers is to dismiss, to repudiate,
the idea that the French People's Front government and
the British Tory government will help.
In the four months of civil war France and Britain
have indicated their unyielding position. Official recogni-
tion by Hitler-Mussolini changes nothing, but on the con-
trary will, if possible, harden the present Hne of French
and British imperialism. It is theoretically possible, were
France-Britain ready to go to war and had concluded that
Germany-Italy was definitely the enemy, that the French
and British imperiaHsts would make Spain the "little
Belgium" issue for declaring imperialist war (this would
also mean French-British intervention in Spain to insure
control to the "anti-fascist" bourgeoisie). But if anything
is clear in the European situation, it is that England and
France are not prepared for war (England needs two
years to complete her armament) and that both are^ not
convinced that the German-Italian line-up is a definitive
picture of the forces which will confront them in the
next war. Italy is being assiduously courted by both
France and Britain. Both undoubtedly plan to employ
the technique traditionally associated with localized wars
since the Congress of Vienna: diplomatic intervention
after the fight is over to protect their interests. _ Capitalist
politics is not based on pique: Franco (especially since
Britain's vassal, Portugal, has rendered him such generous
aid) would scarcely be likely to break the long-standing
economic ties with England and France, particularly since
these countries are Spain's largest market for agricultural
products. No, aid from France and England for the anti-
fascist cause is simply out of the question.
This is true quite independently of the fact that
capitaHst France and Britain prefer a victory for Franco
rather than the possibility that the victorious workers
and peasants — in spite of Communist and Socialist leaders
declarations for the maintenance of the bourgeois repub-
lic—will go forward to the Federation of Socialist Repub-
lics of Iberia.
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Paiheiic Hopefulness of Stdmists
Four months of the civil war should have convinced f 9' l^" ^"«bling over thrfehobS' Se f nU*'^
those who, hke the Stalinists, having left the moorings 1°°^' ^^''^"^ ^"^ candy sent by anti fa.rUt f ' ^f'^'^J''^
of Marxism and hence incapable of predictive an.lv°° "f^' Jas enough food to last for some month, i!^'; f^^^
best, with thp nJH r^f t-u^ u , "lontns, but at t
of Marxism and hence incapable of predictive analysis had
any illusions about help for anti-fascist Spain from capi-
talist governments. -^
The embattled workers' militia will get help from the
international workmgclass, and from it alone.
But far from becoming more realistic, about this ques-
tion, this key to the Spanish situation, the Stalinists have
lost then- heads completely. The false policy pursued by
the Stalinists these four months has left them and the
Spanish masses more isolated than ever. But the Stalin-
ists behave like men gone mad with desperation and
seize at non-existent straws. I take space to cite two
fantastic instances out of many:
but at
-»^^i5:ssSfE»^
of^he Franco forces Ld tSVSr^ll'.l "'"^'"^"^
of FrrnS: dlrS"jr!un '^ revolutionary atmospherl
or in othe; wayi^ecuril^?^ of workers are purchasing
tions factor7es the ar ;C 'i*^' ^°'^"^ '"^ ^he muni^
arn;s which France JetdsW;" transportation of the
the most class-conscious and '^^ producmg, are among
Among them arT'commr^stToirrr it ""T'''^'
mean by this that thp Ip^^^ I- / ."' ^"^ '^^ ^o "ot
to their"^ work But tileSeSie '''''' ^^''^ '' ^^^^^^^
Spain in such a cnn.n ° i'!^^^ '^1 _^_^^^""& ^^ "^s for
in.
Difficulties Can Be Surmounted
oW
When Roosevelt (whose most solid backing came from Spain in such a conspiratoS aton.S, ° ^^ ^
the Curley, Farley, Tammany and other machines openly vent the possibility that arm. fr^ ?J "'P''^ *° P""
committed to Franco, not to speak of the class character an important source of miHtarv^,.!!^^ workers becom
of the Roosevelt administration !) was elected, the Stalin- military supplies for Spai
ists said:
"Though the Spanish civil war was not a direct
issue in the election, the Roosevelt administration
cannot overlook the implications of the defeat ad-
ministered to the American accomplices of the
Spanish rebels.
"That vote should be regarded as a mandate to
throw the weight of America's influence on the side
of Spanish democracy as a means of defending world
democracy and world peace." (DAILY WORKER
editorial November 6, 1936).
And when American imperialism, in a bold and grand-
iose move against European and especially British im-
perialist interests in the Western Hemisphere, prepares
the Buenos Aires Parley:
"That conference can become one of the most
powerful forces to block the fascist drive to a new
world conflagration.
"The Inter-American Peace Conference must act
to stay the bloody hand of Hitler and Mussolini.
"By warning the fascist powers that the United
States is ready to act with all forces standing for
peace, with the Soviet Union, France, China, the
small nations threatened with the Soviet Union, and
with the League of Nations, as well as the people of
Britain and other countries who so earnestly desire
peace, the fascist bandits can be stopped in their
tracks." (DAILY WORKER editorial, November
19, 1936).
The hysterical syntax is appropriate for this raving.
Are the Stalinists fools enough to believe this farrago
of nonsense? Or are we witnessing a frenzied attempt
to cover up a plan to leave the Spanish workers in the
|urch, and to blame the capitulation on the "failure" of
the democratic" countries to come to the aid of Spain?
We must repeat, until we reach every worker befud- ^^P^t^list governments against "their" workers organiz-
dled by this Stalinist clap-trap, that no big capitalist 1."^ ^'" shipments to Spain. Workers will be learning
govemn,ent will aid the Spanish people Only the aid ^°''^ *° organize revolutions ! Even if, m a given country,
'^^ "' • r f J' L IV. aiu ^Yi^ revolutionary situation may not materiahze for a
geenration, this is far too valuable a field of training
Naturally the technical aspects of securing arms fof
Spain must remain-especially with the metho^ds Solved
m the work of the Fernch comrades-a closely- eSed
secret. But the political campaign must be ope'Lfy deve
loped m meetings factories, the press, in the streets
wherever one can find the masses. The slogan "Arms fo;
"The ?n""\ Pf°Pl^'';-Pl-ity amplified fo mean tha
Wn P?r-H ^r^^"^"" ^l* ^'"^^ Only If the Workers
Will Pioyide Them,' must become a mass slogan, must
reach millions upon millions. Out of those who are reach-
ed by this slogan will come, not only funds of such hug-e
proportions as will make ridiculous the present human-
itanan-level collections for food, but also— and this refers
to America as well— the highly-skilled technicians, so
desperately needed to serve in the workers' armies. A
serious organization of advanced workers, with numerous
contacts in every city and district, will find many ways
at Its disposal for testing the integrity of technicians
offering their aid. In a country like France, with its vast
workers' parties, it would be a simple task to organize
committees of factory workers known to each other
and together knowing hundreds and hundreds of others,
and thus protect their work against enemy agents. While
not so easy in America, the fundamental process would
be the same. If we show that we mean business, friends
will turn up everywhere with information on where and
how arms can be purchased. The traffic in arms goes
on both here and in South America on a vast scale. It
can be turned to use for the Spanish workers. But only
if we rally great masses behind us. And that can be
done only by a public, programmatic propaganda and or-
ganization for arms for the Spanish workers, which can
in no way be confused with the necessary, carefully
guarded, technical arrangements.
Undoubtedly there will be strong resistance from all
capitalist governments against "their" workers organiz-
- •■--- ^t-^.^^" t.,.*^!,*^. wiii^ LUC dm
oi tne international workingclass is available. And that
aid cannot be organized, cfnnot be developed until the p™"tion, this is far too valuable a field of tra.nmg
!■:*!![;" cleari; understands that only /role.arlL 'all ^'^ SS '! _ ^Fr""Th ' '° f "tl!;' „''de'rsta''d If
IS possible for Spain
Arms the Essential Need
The only real material aid to the Spanish masses is to
provide them with arms. The horrible irony of Irun must
without hindrance. From this perfectly understandable
situation, however, one cannot draw the conclusion that
the arms campaign cannot be public in the sense we have
above outlined. Some leakage is bound to occur in any
large-scale activit}^- if it were being conducted secretly
that is, without rallying large masses to the support
i-.v-.yiuc tnem witn arms, the horrible irony of Irun must —that is, without rallying large masses to the support
not be repeated : workers with empty rifles, all cartridges of the principle involved — governmental suppression would
exhausted, waiting until the fascists would discover the be enormously facilitated.
SOCIALIST APPEAL.
P-:-!3",r.tt"^i.ll .oleTni^ents hesitate to take
Sts;- ^r^ctsely then will gover
actions for outright suppression of
It
the movement.
French Workers Musi Take Lead
,, to the French workingclass, Ja^ more than ^ to
Spanish masses look or J-1 -pporj- j^^e ^^^^^.^^^^.^^
the -°'-'^"\°'^,^;,'de;i if we take the t'ask seriously.
But San e i's fn a revolutionary situation, where organ-
? !-.n nf the factory workers has increased more than
rJ^ld in the last year, with the morale and f.ght.ng
H if the wo kers surging forward. What a revolu-
tionary party could do in^France for the Spanish prole-
LrStf The Communist party's "demand" that the gov-
TrS^ent come to the aid of Spain evokes httle response
amon? the non-Communist workers: Blum :s able to
cSce them that governmental intervention means
STr while the Socialist party functionaries _ m closed-
narty meetings get down to cases and tell their members
fha tS C.P sbgan is a Russian trick to force France
Sto war with Germany. But to the slogan for working-
cla*s organization of arms shipments, even the prepon-
derately white collar and governmental employes ot the
S.F.I.O. would respond with all their energies.
Were the Communist party, with its vast apparatus
and its great following among the workers m heavy in-
dustries, to raise this slogan, the S.F.I.O. could refuse col-
laboration only at the peril of losing its militant elements
to the C.P., while even those who would remain would
collaborate 'in the factories, etc. Committees of demo-
cratically-elected workers in factories and shops, ports
and railways, could be established almost over-night;
they could be joined tog:ether in local centers and finally
in a national center. This powerful netv/ork, pulsing v.'ith
the vast energies of the proletarians and sympathizers it
directly represented, could answer governmental attempts
at interference by political strikes and demonstrations on
a scale v/hich would surpass even the recent mass move-
ments. It would concretize the fight against govern-
mental interference by careful preparation of an open
shipment of caterpillar trucks, for example; choose one
of the ports like Brest, overwhelmingly revolutionary in
its proletarian temper for a test-case. In the process of
developing such a vast movement of aid to Spain, the
French proletariat would take a gigantic step forward on
the road to their own developing revolution !
The Soviet Union: Integral part of
the World Proletariat
A FTER nearly four months of hesitation, the Soviet
•^^ Union has sent arms to Spain. We are not revealing
a secret unknown to the v/orld. Indeed, no one is boast-
ing more loudly of the Soviet's shipments than the Com-
munist party press in Spain. If we do not join them in
their jubilation, it is because, firstly, we see no cause
for congratulating the Soviet ]eader.ship for tardily making
a beginning at a task v/hich it is bound to carry out by
the most elementary notions of duty. The constant din
about proletarian solidarity in defense of the Soviet Union
appears to assume that proletarian solidarity is a one-way
process— toward the Soviet Union but not from it. Second-
ly, since the fourth month of the Spanish civil war no
more propitious than the first month for sending arms—
Z ^^^^P^-f-P'tious, in fact, since the non-intervention pact
ZTa.Tw a"!, '" ^^^^t^"«~it is obvious that the Stalin
leadership did not move entirely of its own volition. Not
, . r.A was th<- ^harp criticism of th*-. Spanwh
the least goad was tm i ^^_^,y^ ^,^^^ ^^^
workingdass organizat'o^ns.^
th(
.Syr
h 1^W ^uiSrSpa^'t^Tthe best of its capacity? We
J^^rlhatJ^ne answer' to this basic question is by no mean,
"^/e'volSontts do not ask that the Soviet Union take
the init a ve in an open race to supply arms. Having made
ts/i^t terrible error of joining the non-mtervention corn-
mit ee the Soviet Union cannot be the f^rst to with-
Ta" 'But it can do what Germany and Italy are doing:
sit in the committee and nevertheless ship arms systetn-
""^But^will this not lead to war, and is the Soviet Union
in a position to fight? This argument may be plausible
to those "friends of the Soviet Union to whom Marxism
is an alien quantity, but the most elementary Marxian
analysis will demonstrate the falsity of this question.^ We
Marxists knov/ that wars are not occasioned by mcid-
ents " They arise out of fundamental conflicts among
the 'imperialist nations for markets, raw materials, etc.
and— since the existence of the Soviet Union— the irrecon-
cilability of capitalism v/ith socialism. If a group of
capitalist nations (Germany-Italy, etc.) are now ready to
wage imperialist war against the Soviet Union then they
do not require Spain as a pretext: v/e have only to re-
member that the Agadir incident of 1911, the Balkan
war of 1912 and so many other propitious moments v/ere
not the occasion for war but when one camp v/as ready,
in 1914, a prince's murder was the "cause." If the
Ge-rman-Italian imperialists are ready, they will war
against the Soviet Union anyway.
StaUn's "Breathing Space"
There is, however, a kernel of truth in the Stalinist
argument. A kernel, however, that when brought to light
reveals the anti-internationalist character of Stalinism.
What ia true is that, if the Soviet Union refrains from
supplying arms to Spain, then Germany-Italy will (as-
suming they are actually ready to war against the Soviet)
refrain from declaring war for just so long as it will take
them to destroy the Spanish proletariat ! In other words,
they will delay war against the U.S.S.R. for some
months.
Will those months constitute a "breathing space" for
the Soviet Union? No! In actuality the war against the
Soviet Union is going on already. For the Spanish^ pro-
letariat constitutes a bulwark defending the Soviet Union.
The destruction of the Spanish proletariat, a fate which is
absolutely certain if the international proletariat and its
Soviet section does not come to its aid, will leave the
Soviet Union just so much weaker. This is the stark
tragedy of the Stalinist policy: it is the policy of a solid-
ified bureaucracy, which has become alien to the world
revolution ; which fears for its own status in the event
of an extension of the revolution and the consequent
quickening of the Soviet workers; which puts its faith not
in its only real ally, the international proletariat, but in
its rnanouevers and combinations with capitalist "allies.
Yet this policy endangers the very existence of the Soviet
Union itself. The "breathing space" secured by taking
the French proletariat, straining toward the revolution,
and handcuffing it to the bourgeoisie, and the bloodcurdl-
ing possibility that a like "breathing space" may be sought
t>y abandoning the Spanish proletariat to the fascist
wolves — these are Pyrrhic victories. A few more, perhaps
one more, perhaps this very Spanish "breathing space
if the Stalinist bureaucracy dares to do it — and the
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Soviet Union may cease to exist altogether as a con-
sequence.
Certainly the Soviet Union confronts many technical
difficulties in aiding Spain: the distance, the lack of Soviet
ships, etc. But these can be dealt with if its leadership
first decides that it should help. Trusted revolutionary
sailors and officers can be gathered from other countries,
boats flying foreign flags chartered, etc. etc. Even if
■war does break out, the Soviet Union, repudiating bour-
geois notions of prestige, could simply defend her w^ell-
fortified borders and continue shipping under flags of
friendly nations. The technical question of bow is secon-
dary to the political question.
Under the inspiration of a Soviet policy of aid to Spain,
which can only have meaning if simultaneously the Com-
munist parties abandon their mad policy of demanding
Spanish aid from capitalist governments, the world work-
ing class would experience a tremendous rebirth. The
powerful resurgence of the international proletariat would
provide the Soviet Union with a loyal, fearless defense
such as no capitalist "ally" will give her for a single day.
International Aid Requires a
ReVolutionar-TQ Polici^
in Spain
ID from the Soviet Union and the rest of the prole-
tariat can only be effective, however, if the Spanish
workers pursue a revolutionary policy in their struggle
against fascism.
The latest-model People's Front governments now re-
igning in Madrid and Catalonia are bourgeois govern-
ments. That a majority of the cabinet ministers belong
to workers' organizations does not change the class nature
of these governments. On the contrary, it is precisely
since these majorities were established, thereby resuscitat-
ing the prestige which these governments had lost by
their cowardly and treacherous behavior in the first days
of the civil war, that the "dual power" of the workers has
been almost entirely liquidated. The remnants of the
notorious Guardia Civil, a body of men tramed for genera-
tions in hostility to the workingclass, simply had its name
changed to the "National Republican Guard" and is being
rapidly expanded by careful recruiting under Guardia
Civil officers. The workers' militia, which has its own
elected worker-officers and treated regular army officers
as mere technicians, has now been miHtarized, subjected
to the Military Code, and attempts are being made to
transfer all authority to regular army officers. Compul-
sory mobilization of all able-bodied men into regular army
regiments is now taking place. Thus all the armed forces
are being gathered into the hands of the "republican
military caste, that is to say, of the bourgeoisie.
If this trend continues it may lead to catastrophe. Like
the "democratic" bourgeoisie of Germany, Italy, Austria,
which quickly made their peace with fascism, bowing to
the capitalist decision that fascistn was necessary, the
democratic poIitTcians of Spain — Azafia, Companys, Bar-
rios, etc.— actually attempted to make their peace with
the Spanish fascists. As I have described elsewhere* this
treachery was only prevented by the independent uprising
of the workers. Surrounded by the armed proletariat,
with the real power in the hands of the workers' com-
mittees, Azafia & Co. began singing a different tune. But
if these politicians succeed in gathering back into their
* "The Civil War in Spain," Pioneer Publishers, 100 Fifth Ave.,
New York.
off.r I ^VT T^-^"^ '°'^ °" J"'y 1^' t^^" they will again
Ts forth 'C ^^'■^"'"- ^^^ '^'^'y ^^y to prevent that
IS for the workers to secure control, through factory and
combatants democratically-elected committees, over the
toundations of state power.
Moreover, political collaboration with the "democratic"
bourgeoisie has prevented the workers from using the
revolutionary weapons available for rallying the most
backward sections of the masses in the anti-fascist re-
gions and for driving a decisive wedge between Franco
and the Moors and peasants : a general decree confiscat-
ing all landed estates, empowering their division by
peasant committees, and guaranteeing permanent occupa-
tion of the land without compensation; decreeing the com-
plete independence and freedom of Morocco and an al-
liance between the Spanish workers and peasants and the
Moorish people; genuinely democratic rule of Spain
through a National Congress of Workers, Peasants and
Combatants' Deputies; confiscation of all big enterprises
and guaranty of jobs to all. What irony, that Franco has
demagogically promised land to the peasants and auton-
omy to Morocco, while the Madrid government has re-
mained silent!
Stalinists Corrupt Workers Organizations
The Stalin regime bears considerable responsibility for
the reformist policy of the Spanish workers' organiza-
tions. When — at the celebration of the anniversary of
the Russian Revolution 1 — Consul Antonov-Ovseenko de-
clared, "Long live the Catalonian people and its hero.
President Companys," he was putting an official Soviet
seal of approval on the policy of subordination to the
"democratic" bourgeoisie. The most persistent advocate
of this policy is the Spanish Communist party, and its
press makes clear, in no uncertain terms, that behind it
stands the Soviet Union. Caballero enunciated a policy
of making the proletarian revolution simultaneously with
fighting the civil war, before he became Premier; with-
out white-washing his responsibihty for reversing him-
self, it is undoubted that he was subjected to Soviet pres-
sure. After Soviet arms began to arrive the Catalonian
Stalinists secured a pact with the Anarchist National
Confederation of Labor, which wipes out the last vestige
of the proletarian policy previously enunciated by the
C.N.T. . ■
The international workingclass must fight against this
policy, which can only lead to defeat of the Spanish
masses We can and must urge upon our Spamsh com-
rades the absolute necessity of a revolutionary course.
We can secure a hearing, we can lend /^on^Jftion to
?"'f's^.™g,.e of soci.,.™ against cap,.a^^^^^^^
:rSs^:nreTre*trvra?rro./.h= woHd p,0Mana.
The Sodalis. pan, IS^A- ica can an^shculd^P^ay
til tote-lplt. pfr W^e ™e. no. p.e«„. » -;«
numerical strength tl,a» "■= P'f/f „,„;„,,„i. The way
vanguard of a {'""'''"'^fStrno other ahemative i£
to begin IS toh'^Sm.vi^ .^^ comrades,
we seriously desire to ?°I'P„1 °„„,,„ i„ Spain and
The struggle -sf^'^fZsltLl"\r.Je and em
an armed struggle. We "™ Linrr victory. Arms for the
l"p?„i?; wX^^r'SSylL^In^er'natioil Wor.ingclass^
Will Send Arms!
is
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Reactionaries Triumph — Only in Tampa
BY ARNE SWABECK
N
OVEMBER third recorded an almo.t u„a„i„,o^s labor
, m r -o .»,.^it Three weeks later the A.i^. ot i^.
11 vote for Roose^^elt. ^h r^e .^^ ,ong-standing
convention at Tampa, ^ /.^^^.^^,;^,i^ ^plit. These two
confhct to ^ ^^"".'^ ^/^^^ reflect the contradictory tend-
events, °/P-J^ ^^.r n o-ment today. Future develop-
Ss will no doubt bring out the full imphcat.ons and
show the far-reaching consequences.
R„t how is the existence of the opposite tendencies
whih these e^^nts seem to portray, to be explamed?
Sn tie one hand there was an apparent unanimity of
?nlit cal choice On the other hand there is an irrecon-
?S dlvison-into two conflicting camps, mutually re-
iminating and mutually hostile. Is this a -s of he
division being more apparent than real , or is t the ot^ er
wav around namely that the unanimity of pol ticaL cnoicc
^a more apparent than real? These questions canno
be anTwered'by a simple yes or no. Insofar as the pit
is concerned little doubt is possible. When it s presented
n its most simplified form of a struggle between craft
union supporters and the champions of industrial union-
"sm the distinction is clear. The antagonistic forces, the
AF of L. and the C.I.O. stand out equally clear. It need
not follow that there should also be a conflict about the
support of Roosevelt, and there was none. Nevertheless
a differentiation of political methods is now arisirig be-
tween the two hostile camps. A comparison of the at-
titude displayed by both sides during the election cam-
pai°-n and the attitude to the outcome of the election v/iii
make this abundantly clear. There is no unanimity m
regard to the time honored non-partisan political policy
practiced by the labor lieutenants of capitalism over_ a
period of decades. The C.I.O. leaders have become dis-
tinctly partisan. Moreover, headed by John _L. Lewis,
they are departing from this policy and moving in the
direction of tying up the trade union movement more
closely with the capitalist political state.
Lewis and his associates took an especially active part
in the drafting of the Democratic party platform, ihey
took charge of the labor end of the party's election cam-
paign without a selection by Jim Farley. They were
the actual creators of Labor's Non-Partisan League the
purpose of which was to whip the trade unions into line
in the Roosevelt column. After November third Lewis
hailed the accomplishments as a "magnificent victory for
labor." At the same time he called upon the workers to
"organize themselves to consolidate their political victory
and translate it into material benefits and reforms." Ac-
cording to this the fruits of this victory are to come
from the second Roosevelt administration.
Reactionaries at Tampa
The petrified reactionaries in control of the Tampa
convention were not so exuberant. Most of them had
supported the President's re-election. Most of them
had supported the New Deal measures. But they took
great care lest the traditional political policy of reward-
ing their friends and punishing their enemies among the
agents of privilege be infringed upon. Such an infringe-
ment they would resent and repudiate no matter what the
conditions may be. The task of organization of labor and
political indorsements of "friends of labor" is to them
just an everyday humdrum affair. Their political indorse-
. i,^H never been much more effective than their
""mpts?o organize labor. In their own particular field
Sev are no less reactionary than the heads of the big
corporations who fight the unions most ruthlessly. Fun-
da ei'tally these people are deeply convinced supporters
orthecefebrated bourgeois ideal of so called rugged
dv dualism. Concessions given to the unions they are
nerfecUy willing to reward with a political mdorsement
IndSZ endeavor to maintain what they consider to be
a perfect equilibrium between capital and labor.
This reactionary character the Tampa convention re-
flected in every one of its important actions. It proceeded
to unwind the history and growth of the labor move-
inent its sacrifices and its struggles, in reverse form.
But is was on the defensive, almost to the point of futile
impotence. The unmitigated arrogance displayed through-
out the conflict had met a stiff challenge from the C.I.O.
All hopes that a wedge could be driven in between the
adherents of industrial unionism, to divide them, and
thus make them submit to the Executive Council terms,
had been blasted. The haughty self-confidence had disap-
peared A change of tone was distinctly noticeable.
Charges of fomenting an insurrection in the AF. of L.,
and diarges of dual unionism, were left out of the resolu-
tion on the C.I.O. that was finally adopted. However
there was no change of actual position. The hard boiled
craft union officials, while put on the defensive, did,
nevertheless, not relinquish their voting power. And so
by a vote of 21,679 to 2,043 the split received the official
and irrevocable seal of the federation. It was the seal of
its own stagnation and eventual doom. From the point
of view of both internal dynamics and external policies,
this convention resembled a graveyard for anything that m
might appear to be tinged with even the mildest form m
of progressivism. Indeed, the rage of futile irnpotence
reached a climax of comedy in a prelude to the main
action when the convention decided, by viva voce vote,
to boycott the union label of the Amalgamated Oothing
Workers.
Progressive Measures Defeated
Unprecedentedly reactionary measures followed in rapid
succession. While the maritime workers on the Pacmc
Coast are fighting for the very life o their organization ,
assisted by sailors on the Atlantic and on the Gulf Coasts,
F°H =f;'o^s/rT;? oTt": vStiordi^vowe-d
ternational otticiais, tne r\.r. u^ ^ ^
the whole business. Bitterly hostile to _ any idea o
rr^ilitant strueele the unscrupulous mandarins, who were
^'controf aTfampa. couple u? this disavowal -th a - e
which at first sight would seem P-gressive m chanic e
They decided to explore the possibility of f^ ;°™^ j^jg
of a Maritime Department. In actuality however Jhs
Represents also a defensive move that is ^--f^^^f ',"„^1
the maritime rebellion m ^\ ^f "^Z '° Sns
strengthen the bureaucratic control of the umons.
Of course, not all the delegates were in harmony with
this stultifying quackery. Some of them P-P°^;<^^^f ,"„
trade unTols Igainst Negroes, were unceremoniously re
n
SOCIALIST-
jected. And, in order to make sure that there should be
no mistake about what the A.F. of L. means to do in
poHtics, the Tampa convention turned thumbs down, in a
demonstrative manner, on several labor party resolutions
and reaffirmed the traditional non-partisan political policy.
No possibility of misinterpretation exists. The A.F.
of L. bureaucracy does not mean to depart one hair's
breadth from its long practiced class collaboration policy.
Let the chips fall where they may, let the blows be
struck against the trade union movement by the em-
boldened and aggressive forces of capitalism; it has no
intention of changing its course.
But the A.F. of L. has not eliminated or even reduced
seriously its contradictions of yesterday. By the conven-
tion approval of the action against the C.I.O. it has adopted
a form of centralization of powers vested in its leadership
which it has never been able to enforce. Its ability to
do this will hardly be enhanced now. This centralization
will come into conflict with its own make-up consisting
of autonomous unions, not at all guided by a common
line, often in jurisdictional disputes, and often raiding
each others preserves. New rebellion is brewing now
against the general policy and against the major conven-
tion decisions. Besides this, henceforth the A.F. of L.
will face the C.I.O. in a struggle for supremacy of the
movement.
Future Policy of C.I.O.
The split is consummated. The C.I.O. is now an en-
tirely independent organization. While the A..F. of L. of-
ficialdom was busy at Tampa the former was actively
engaged in campaigns of organization, laid further plans,
and made new appropriation of funds to extend these
campaigns. While it will not do to be too sangume about
their ability to carry out their own avowed plans, the
contrast of the endeavors of these two bodies is never-
theless clear. Not to be too sanguine means not to have
any expectation that the C.I.O. leaders intend to discard
the class collaboration policy always practiced by all ot
them in common. There is no reason for such an expec-
tation and certainly not until a genuinely progressive
movement compels them to do so. Let us not forget that
it was precisely the C.I.O. leaders who supported Roo-
sevelt's re-election most ardently and most vociferously.
They instilled the greatest illusion into the minds of the
workers about his New Deal policy; all in all this is a
reactionary position.
Contrary to the A.F. of L. bureaucracy the C.l'.O. leaders
have distinguished themselves by their greater resolution
and their readiness to take a chance with ventures of
mass organization into new fields. They are ready to
tackle organization on a mass basis in the very strong-
hold of monopoly capitalism and to organize along in-
dustrial lines. This is the progressive feature of their
position, and it offers also the richest possibilities of the
development of a genuinely progressive movement. Hut,
while the A.F. of L. bureaucracy adheres strictly to its
perspective based on cooperation between capital and labor
and reaffirms its non-partisan pohtical policy, the Ui.U.
leaders seek, through new political methods to establish
a new equilibrium without, however, discarding the class
collaboration policy. For what else can their support ot
the Roosevelt administration mean? No doubt was pos-
sible in their minds of the fact that he was the candidate
of the present day majority capitalist party and that he
is likewise the executive head of the capitalist govern^
ment. Therefore the question: can this be interpretca
in any other way than an attempt to tie up the trace
union movement more closely to the capitalist political
state? 1, r«
With this end in view, Lewis called upon the workers
5or?nnH"i"' *'?"'"^^1^." to consolidate their political vic-
Tl7s is thoT'"'' 'I "^'^ '"^'"'^' '^^"^f'ts and reform^" i
ihis IS the slogan to organize w<ith Roosevelt The ?ov- ,
crnment will be expected to serve as labor's friend lo
put the brakes on the "insolence and arrogance of '
dtrint' c '"? 7;''\ '"^^'■'^ ^^^^^'"^' t« compel the recal-
torms. But what Lewis does not announce is, that in
o hoM th^ °':i ^' '^"^ '^■^ ^''°''^''' -'" be 'expect^S
to ho d the trade union movement in check, to prevent
nmnnl T'' '^'', '^^ J^^urbing strikes and to f^orestai
among the workers the development of an independent
class Ideology. Deprived of this development, and checked
in their struggles no real material benefits for the work-
ers will be possible.
Role of the Capitalist Stale
ork-^^
Besides, the capitalist political state is not, and caff
no case be made to serve working class ends. Concessions
to the workers it may grant, and then only after the work-
ing class movement, by its own determination and strug-
gle, brings sufficient pressure to bear. And this must of
necessity take on the form of a struggle against the
capitalist state, whose real function is that of an organ
of class rule. So long as the capitalist class remains in
power the political state will continue to function as its
main instrument of suppression of the workers.
What has been stated above in the abstract the work-
ing class may soon experience in practice, taught to them
in far simpler, but also in far more telling terms. A new
great strike wave is highly probable and already fore-
shadowed by the present maritime strike. In regard
to such developments the big corporation heads have
shown clearly where they stand. Why give concessions,
they say to themselves, we can handle labor in our own
way. We have our company unions, our blacklists and
our own police. We are the strongest in the courts, and
when it becomes necessary to resort to the real authorita-
tive forces of the state we can wield it for our own pur-
poses. These threats they will attempt to make good.
With the revival of business and the return of profits and
dividends the monopoly corporations become only so much
more determined in their desire to defeat and smash the
unions.
During his first administration, President Roosevelt
succeeded, through moral persuasion and complete co-
operation from all the labor lieutenants of capitalism, to
strangle the auto workers' and steel workers unions by
writing into the codes of these industries the infamous
"merit clause" and "proportional representation provi-
sions which gave the employers carte blanche to tire
Torkers suspected of union activity and Pla-d compan
unions on an equality with genuine ^o-^^f ^^ °[f ;„'^^,
tinns Going beyond moral persuasion and on to more
r- methyls, .-/xtile strikers were herded -to joncen-
tration camps by Den,ocrat,c governors. These^ were
inous signs, poa'"'.,!,!""!!.. l.^Til. ' W U he be
om
)nd Roosevelt administration.
have the secona jkooscvcil a^w.-.o ■ -
aWe to play a role separate from, or contrary to, that
Lid out for him to follow by the real rulers of America
Oi course not. He will still remain the executive head of
Of -_
the capitalist political state.
The actual organization of the -^^^^ P^^^^^f.'^^e tTan
tries, if it is to be undertaken in earnest may ^oone t
expected .bring all ^of ^h-e issii^es^ to^a 1-ci^^, ^ ^^^
attempt to tie-up the cause
workers to understand.
lalist^
i
12
SOCIALIST APPEAL
C.I.O. and Steel Workers
By B. CRANE
OVER three months ago the Committee for Industrial
Organization signed an agreement with the officials
of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin
Workers for the inauguration of a nation-wide drive to
organize the steel industry. An initial sum of $550,000
was raised by the United Mine Workers, the Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers, the International Ladies
Garment Workers and several other unions ; business of-
fices were set up in Pittsburgh, regional offices establish-
ed throughout Ohio, in Chicago, Buffalo and other key
cities, and some 200 field workers were sent out to start
the actual work of organization. John L. Lewis an-
nounced over a nation-\vide hook up : — "Organized labor
in America accepts the challenge of the omnipresent over-
lords of steel to fight for the prize of economic freedom
and industrial democracy." The big steel drive was on !
All of us were elated by the developments, because we
knew that steel could be organized and because we also
knew that once strong union organization was established
in the mighty Steel empire, the enthusiasm! and neces-
sary impetus ■w.'oiild be provided for the launching of a
sweeping drive to organize millions of unorganized auto-
mobile, metal machining, machine tool, rubber, textile
and other workers engaged in the mass production in-
dustries, and that such an influx of new membership
would almost automatically transform the whole Amer-
ican labor movement and bring into being a new epoch,
much richer in content and one m.uch m.ore rapid in its
tempo of development.
While the favorable moment for organization of steel
workers that obtained in 1934 during the time of the for-
mation of the "Committee of Ten" 'and the Rank & File
Movement in the Amalgamated Association had passed,
the C.I.O. nevertheless possessed the necessary resources
to conclude the task undertaken successfully.
Comparison with 1919
As compared with the situation in 1919, for instance,
all external advantages are with the Steel workers' Or-
ganization Committee. The political temper of the coun-
try is favorable for union organization. Production
schedules were sharply tapering off at the end of the
war and lay-offs were on the order of the day in the
steel mills ; to-day the steel industry is recording an up-
ward swing with constantly increasing demand for steel.
The old 1919 Committee started its campaign with prac-
tically no funds; great financial resources are at the
command of the present Committee with an initial sum
of over half a million dollars at their disposal. The
danger of twenty four craft unions each bickering over
their jurisdictional claims in the industry has also been
ehmmated by the C.I.O. in the agreement concluded to
organize the steel workers into one broad union taking-
m all members engaged in or around the steel industry
Because of its ample resources, the present steel drive
has taken on the character of a national campaign simul-
taneously launched in all steel cities and involving all the
plants of the major steel masters. This aspect of the
campaign, so necessary for the successful prosecution of
the drive, the old 1919 Committee was unable to achieve
because of its slender financial resources, until after a
year s work.
With all of these considerable advantages that the pre-
sent committee possesses over the old one, we expected
to witness a campaign that was aggressive, bold, dramata
and swift. 1
Dramatic Campaign Expected
Our judgment on this was based on the followin
major considerations: First, our feeling that the be
argument, the argument most calculated to impress th,
steel worker, was not an academic recital of the ad-
vantages of unionism and what hours and wages the steel
workers might gain if they would join the organization
or even agitational lectures reciting the tremendous
wealth that is being accumulated by the steel baron^
through the toil of the poorly renumerated steel worker J
No,^ the most eloquent argument was a description of thl
national campaign that was in progress which wa^
rapidly organizing the steel workers in every part of th|
country and would in the course of the next few montO
swiftly strike on behalf of the steel workers; an iron
determination to build the steel union no matter whati
the costs or battles necessary for its achievement. What!
was involved here, was not just another routine attcmpli
to bring several thousand new members into the unioJ
and set up a few more lodges; the steel workers, on th3
contrary, were witnessing an epoch-making "extraor-
dinary" campaign to break the stranglehold of the Steel
and Iron Institute over the lives of half a million wage
slaves. In other words, this time we mean business!
It is obvious that all the dramatic advantages of such
a campaign lie in its swiftness and boldness of approach.
The longer the campaign is allowed to drag out the more
time there is_ for demoralization to set in and for the
steel companies to maneuver and terrorize their em-
ployees.
And then there is another factor. The C.I.O. still has
the job of establishing itself as the leader of the American
labor movement. The most eloquent argument here
which would convince most rank and file unionists that
the future truly lies with the C.I.O. would be to con-
front the A. F. of L. convention with the actual organ-
ization of the bulk of the workers of the steel industry.
This, however, was not the case.
What has actually occured? The Journal of Commerce
spoke correctly in its Oct. 25 issue of the "slow progress
of the Union drive so far." To understand the basic
reasons for the slow progress of the drive we believe one
must turn to an examination of the political position of
the C.I.O. leadership.
Supporters of Rooseoelt
As is well known, all of the unjons comprising the C.I"
are rather ardent and vociferous supporters of President ',
Roosevelt. Hillman, speaking at a recent convention, |
told the delegates present that they would not be allowed
to strike next year if Roosevelt was defeated for the
Presidency. It seems to us an inescapable conclusion j
after observing the w^hole conduct of the drive since its i
inception that the C.I.O. leadership had deliberately ap-
plied the brakes on the steel campaign in order not to
embarass Roosevelt prior to the election.
The achievement of collective bargaining in the steel
industry will unquestionably necessitate a general strike
in the steel industry with the very strong possibility that
the steel strike may start off a new strike wave, which
is bound by the nature of the case, to be more wide-
d
SOCIALIST APPEAL
spread and of more virulent intensity than the strike
wave that followed the setting up of the N.R.A. There
is no question too, that Lewis, Murra)' and that whole
crowd know very well the dangers of delay and of pid-
dling: around with the work of organization. Neverthe-
less, the "friendship" of Roosevelt and the "gentleman's
agreement" that may have been consummated loom of
much greater importance in their minds than the thousand
dangers that lurk when a great venture is delayed and
dragged out.
The C.I.O. is not yet a stabilized body. Its progressive
character lies m the fact that it has boldly proclaimed
the major job of the labor movement to-day to be the
organization of the key mass production industries and
that it has infused the whole labor movement with the
conviction that this organization work is possible of
achievement, if only the attempt is made with sufficient
energy and decision. The job of attracting the bulk of
the mass production workers to its banner still lies be-
fore the C.I.O. At this early stage, one would expect the
C.I.O. to be most militant and aggressive. But the CIO
leadership reveals itself to be even now an extremely
conservative group with its basic policy that of class
collaboration and a firm' tie-up with the present system.
And conservatism and class collaboration take a particular-
ly cruel revenge upon any labor organization at the pre-
sent time, when what is absolutely necessary to progress,
is the militancy and the offensive that is only possible
when based on an independent working class policy.
13
,,,, . ^0 Confidence in Lewis
Ihese points, I believe, deserve to be especially stressed
at the present time, because evea among Socialists too
r;:(edr^l."'?"'^ T ^'^ ""^"^^ have1.ecome nteraU;
Uz/Jed by the changed turn of events and confused by
't 'S'P- T ^'"^ ?* **^^ y°""g Socialist trade unionists
say. Irue Le^yls is supporting Roosevelt and politically
of course, that us very bad. In that sense he is mislead
ing the workers But as far as his trade union Ine is
concerned, it is above reproach.'* The argument is false.
Opportumsm ,s like poisoning of the blood. It cannot
affect one part of the organism without spreading to
every cell o the body. Lewis's political opportunism
has already shown its harmful effects in the present delay
m the organization of the steel workers. The d'O
policy of class collaboration will be put to a much
severer test, however, when the actual battle with the
employers occurs and when all of the governmental agen-
cies are bound to be brought into play in order to break
the ranks of the steel workers.
While recognizing the progressive features of the C.I.O.
and its organizing work, we must proceed from the
basis that neither Lewis, nor Murray nor Dubinsky are
our people or travelling in our direction; that the Amer-
ican trade union movement needs above all the organi-
zation of a real left wing, completely independent of the
bureaucracies, unhesitatingly fighting for a consistent,
clear-cut class struggle policy.
TOWARD SOCIALIST CLARITY
ALBERT GOLDMAN
i
After the Election -- "What?
'TpHERE are comrades who evidently consider the de-
■■■ crease in the number of votes received by our party,
in comparison with the vote of 1932, such a serious
defeat that it appears necessary to them to seek for some
immediate cure, and for some strange reason they find it
in a Farmer-Labor party. Alysterious indeed is it to
revolutionary Marxists to explain why, after a campaign
when Farmer-Laborites of every hue and description
flocked into the camp of the leading New Dealer, it should
be the duty of Socialists to push the organization of
Farmer-Labor parties. An inability to face reality plus
a terrible and needless fright are the only valid explana-
tions.
To one who possesses the slightest ability at Marxian
analysis the decrease in the number of votes for our party
is not at ail puzzling. Leaving all other considerations
aside — such as have been mentioned in the lead editorial
in this issue — the glaring fact stands out that the S.P.
of 1936 is not the S.P. of 1932. A purely reformist party
such as the S.P. was in 1932 is much more likely, in non-
revolutionary periods, to receive a comparatively large
vote than a revolutionary party. I do not claim that the
party is at present a revolutionary party but compared
with 1932 its fundamental approach is considerably closer
to revolutionary Marxism. I'n fact it was the only party
which, during the campaign, stressed the fundamental
alternative facing the present epoch: SOCIALISM versus
CAPITALISM.
In 1932 every liberal voted for the Socialist ticket be-
cause the Socialist party stood for a peaceful and gradual
change of the capitalist system. The Roosevelt myth
was not in existence and every Avorker who wanted soc-
ialism but was not convinced that it was necessary to
struggle for it voted the Socialist ticket. Now these
same liberals and workers see a much better chance of
getting the reforms they want by voting for Roosevelt.
And a great many of these liberals and workers realize
that the Socialist party has changed and they arc not
ready as yet to accept that change.
It would be extreme folly for us to create an illusion
that the working class will follow us immediately upon
our becoming a revolutionary party. Under certain cir-
cumstances the contrary may be true. A party passing
through a transition period such as confronts the Social-
ist party, will of necessity lose a great many supporters
who wanted the old and not the new party. It is not
enough to change a declaration of principles; it is not
even enough to become very active in the class truggle,
as is absolutely necessary. There must in addition be
the elem'ent of upswing in the labor movement before
our revolutionary approach and our active participation
in the struggle "bear fruit in the form of millions of
votes.
If we could only say that the campaign as carried on
by our party educated our own party members, con-
solidated our ranks, and succeeded in educating the ad-
vanced workers then we could pronounce the campaign
an unqualified success regardless of the number of vo as
Such was the situation in our party and in the labor
ntovement that no one had the right to expect anything
but an educational campaign.
It would of course be improper in a public organ to
E
SOCIALIST APPEAL
attack those who were responsible for the serious defects
L the conduct of the can.paign. We 1^°?% o ^e able to
be more explicit in a special number of the API EAL
which will be circulated amongst party members only.
Here we can say that the critique of Roosevelt and his
New Deal and the emphasis on the idea that not bourgeois
democracy but socialism is the goal of our struggles,
correct and necessary as they were, could not of them-
selves be sufficient. It was necessary to take advantage
of the important events of the day to educate our own
members and the advanced workers through an analysis
of those events from a revolutionary standpoint and to
show by such an analysis that we were correct as against
all other parties and tendencies. It is enough to state,
that outside of a a few pamphlets by comrade Thomas
in which he gave an excellent critique of the New Deal,
there was not a single pamphlet on any important cur-
rent event, to show that our campaign was too abstract
to be of any real educational value. To put it bluntly our
campaign literature was practically non-existent and
whatever there was of it, outside of the Thomas pamph-
lets, was atrocious.
* * * *
But to come back to the original question. Why the
sudden interest on the part of some leading comrades
in a Farmer-Labor party; why the overwhelming desire
to call a convention to change the Cleveland resolution on
the Farmer-Labor party?
I am not overstepping the boundaries of propriety when
I divulge the fact that there is a minority of the party
that is opposed to the Cleveland resolution. As a minority
these comrades, believing in the necessity of a disciplined
party, do not oppose the resolution except in inner party
discussions. But it is not at all opposing the Cleveland
resolution to say that the sudden campaign which leading
comrades have initiated for the purpose of calling a con-
vention to change the Cleveland resolution is a very
dangerous move trom the point of view of building the
Socialist party. For it is obviously the intention of these
comrades anxious to change the Cleveland resolution to
do so for the worse and not for the better. 'I hat is, it is
their intention to alter it so that more freedom can
be given sections of the party anxious lo create some
kind of a Farmer-Labor party concoction.
What is there in the present situation that demands our
active attempts to create Farmer-Labor parties ? It has
been pointed out by various comrades that the chances for
a national Farmer-Labor part}' are slimmer now than
they were before Roosevelt's election. Ihere is in ac-
tuality no real move to create a national i-armcr-Labor
party. Why the rush then? Even assuming that local
irarmer-Labor parties are about to spring up everywhere
the Cleveland resolution is a sufficient guide for our lead-
ing bodies to act.
No revolutionary Socialist is opposed to a convention
but at the present moment a convention should be called,
if at all, to lay down those principles which will make
possible the building of a revolutionary Socialist party
and not to throw our efforts into the creation of local
I-armer-Labor parties. Any analysis of the election and
the part which the Socialist party played m it which
ends with a note on the necessity of building a Farmer-
J-abor party is thoroughly opportunist and false. I must
congratulate the editorial board of the SOCIALIST CALL
that m the analysis of the elections in the issue of Nov-
ember 21, the section dealing with the tasks of the Social-
ist party does not mention one word about the necessity
of building a Farmer-Labor party.
To take a correct revolutionary position on all the
problems confronting us, national and international, to
educate our members, to throw ourselves into the strug-
gles of the working class, struggles that are inevitable
in the coming period — -these are the tasks confronting uj
and not the building of local reformist Farmer-Labor
parties.
The National Executive Committee will undoubtedly
decide to hold a convention. The duty of revolutionary
Socialists will be to make a serious effort to balk all at-
tempts to dissipate our energies in the creation of local
Farmer-Labor parties. We must see to it that the
special convention will make the necessary changes to
enable the party to develop farther on the road of revolu-
tionary Marxism.
Stalin's "Gift'' to the Russian People
TO PROPHETIC powers whatever are necessary to
predict that the new "democratic" constitution so
generously granted by the beloved leader will be ap-
proved by the delegates of the Eighth Congress of the
Soviets now being held in iMoscow. At the time of writ-
ing the delegates are still in the period of "discussion"
but with a reckless disregard of all consequences we
prophesy that the constitution will be accepted unanimous-
ly b}' the approximately 2500 delegates present.
"Friends" of the Soviet Union of the type of Louis
Fischer and Norman Angel have claimed and will claim
that the most democratic discussion ever conducted any-
where in the world was held in the Soviet Union on the
question of tlie constitution. A glance at the type of
discussion on the constitution as shown by the transla-
tions from PRAVDA in the DAILY WORKER at the
time when the constitut.on was first proposed, should be
proof enough for any intelligent person that what took
piace was not a discussion by political people on the neces-
sity for the new constitution or on its fundamental prin-
ciples but the giving of thanks to the beloved leader for
his generosity and in suggesting some exceed. ngly minor
and innocuous changes. No discussion on policies; only
suggestions how to execute the policies.
iX'uiuerous are the gems of logic and dialectics found
ill the speech of Stalin explaining and defending the con-
stitution. Interesting is it to note that Stalin spent more
time in taking up the cr.ticisms of the constitution found
in the fasc.st press than answering the criticisms of the
democratic capitalist press. It goes without saying that
no menlion was made of the criticism of the revolution-
ary Marxists. After all to answer the fascists is quite an
easy job.
From the gems we shall mention the following two.
According to Stalin one of the reasons why the new
const. tuiion is necessary is because "Soviet society has
succeeded in creating a socialist order . . . and that the
fundamental principle of this phase of Communism is the
formula: T^rom each according to his abilities; to eacti
according to his deeds'." It is true that .Lenm m distm-
guishing'socialism from communism stated that the above
principle was characteristic of sociahsm but it would De
utterly absurd to contend that the mere existence ot a
state of economic development where such a principle
was recognized meant that socialism had been achieveo.
That principle was recognized and necessarily so m tlie
years before the Five Year Plan was in effect but nor
even Stalin asserted that socialism was in existence then.
No justification for the new constitution is possible Dy
simply stating that socialism is in existence and to prove
that by quoting a phrase from Lenin.
Some critics have asserted that the constitution is
mean.ngless because no opposition part.es will be tole-
rated and consequently there can be no real democracy.
To that Stalin answers from the heights above and with
I
I
I
I
4
SOCIALIST APPEAL
perfect log^ic: Parties can exist in a society where there
are hostile classes. There are no hostile classes in the
Soviet Union. Therefore no other party outside of the
Communist party. (Stalin of course assumes that _ even
a Communist party exists in the Soviet Union, which is
contrarv to the facts.) If one is so ignorant of the
fundamentals of Marxism as to accept such childish
twaddle then he will accept Stalin's premises and also his
conclusions. Assume that there are a few thousand work-
ers who would like to create a new party in the Soviet
Union. Thev will then find out in the concentration
camps in Siberia and in the different jails that they were
incorrect in their attempt because they did not understand
Stalin's system of sociology.
Democracy now has reached its zenith in the Soviet
Union under the regime of Stalin. Whereas before, demo-
cracy was limited only to workers, at present all other
sections of the population will be the beneficiaries of
Stalin's democratic processes. The tragic truth is that
the workers have lost all their democratic rights and the
constitution will not bring those rights back to them.
Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of
the press are all guaranteed by the new constitution
just as thev were in the old constitution of the Russian
Federated Soviet Socialist Republic. Alas, those guaran-
tees are meaningless. There will be freedom of speech,
of press and of assembly only for those who submissively
proclaim the greatness of the beloved leader.
The victory of the working class in November 1917
was justifiably expected to usher in a new epoch when
the contrast between fact and theory ceased to exist.
Under capitalism that contrast must inevitably stare one
in the face. All the grandiloquent phrases of declarations
and constitutions are belied by the facts of capitalist
society. Falsehood is at the bottom of that social
system. It is inconceivable that socialism should be
based on falsehoods.
In the Soviet Union at the present t-me the contrast
between theory and reality is greater than it has ever
been at any time in human history. And necessarily so.
Because in spite of everything, the foundations of the
October 'Revolution, in the sense that the meansof pro-
duction have been taken away from the capitalists, are
still intact. The Stalinist bureaucracy, in order to prevent
the workers from throwing the bureaucrats off their
backs, must speak in socialist terms when in fact there is
no socialism. In the midst of a very low standard of
u-]^ .i"^" announces that "poverty has been abolished";
while old Bolsheviks are being executed he proclaims that
tnere is freedom of assembly ; while thousands of the
best working class elements are in Siberian exile and in
jails for daring to remain true to the traditions of October
Stalm assures us that there is freedom of the press ; while
the most dastardly accusation is levelled against the
eader of the October uprising to the effect that he is in
league with the chief fascist enemy of the Soviet Union,
Stalm boasts about freedom of speech.
No comrades, under socialism there could be no such
terrible contrast between theory and reality.
Labor Action
/^ONGRATULATIONS to the Socialist party of the
^ State of California. At a time when a great many
sections of the party are discouraged by the "defeat" of
the party in the elections, the comrades of California
undertook a tremendous task in launching a weekly paper,
an official organ of the party. And the first issue of
LABOR ACTION is proof that itwill be a Socialist paper,
an organ that will give expression to the revolutionary
spirit of the working class. One can safely say that
it will play a tremendous role in the building of our party
into a revolutionary Marxist party; it will attract to our
ranks the most militant workers ; it will educate those
workers in the principles of revolutionary socialism.
Support LABOR ACTION, — another member in the
family of revolutionar)- Socialist organs. Send your sub-
scription and contribution to LABOR ACTION 628 Mont-
gomery St. Room 334, San Francisco, Calif.
Socialist Call
ND while we are on the subject of socialist organs, di
vou notice the tremendous improvement in the issues
of the CALL beginning with the issue of Nov. 21st? The
new edtors evidently understand that a Socialist paper
is not simply a scrap book of information with a reformist
slant. We hope the improvement is lasting.
I
Committee Formed to Obtain Right of Asylum for Trotsky
(Reprinted from the SOCIALIST CALL)
The American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky has been organized to help obtain for Trotsky his
rights "^of asylum and to aid in the formation of an In-
ternational Commission of Inquiry to examine all the
available evidence in connection with the Moscow trials.
The following statement has been issued by the Com-
mittee, of which Norman Thomas, John Dewey. Freds
Kirchwey, Suzanne La Follette, Devere Allen, Edmund
Wilson, Louis Adam^c, Prof. E. A. Ross of Wisconsin
University, Joseph Wood Krutch, H. M. Kallen. James
T. Farrell, Prof. Wm. H. Kilpatrick of Columbia U., Max
Eastman. Sidney Hook, Inez Haynes Irwin, James Rorty,
Prof. Paul F. Brissenden, Vincent R. Dunne, John Cham-
berlain, Benjamin Stolberg, Louis Hacker are among the
membership:
The Norwegian Government has forbidden Leon Trotsky
to prosecute his libel suit against the Norwegian Com-
munist and Fascist papers. This action is only the
severest of the many repressive measures against him.
For the past two months Trotsky has been a virtual
prisoner of the Norwegian poHce. Police guard him night
and day ; his mail is censored ; he is deprived of all secre-
tarial assistance. This latest order not only deprives
hmi of the last remnants of his democratic rights ot
asylum but closes his last means of answermg the grave
accusations made against him in connection with the
Moscow trial. r t + i,
"The American Committee for the Defense of Irot^ky
protests against this outrageous violation of democratic
lights by fhe Norwegian Government -d demands that
the full rights of asylum be restored to Trotsky- ifte
rnost elementary notions of justice dictates that his
world-famous re^^olutionist should be given the fullest
Tnd freest opportunity to state his case. -p^iA^^
The comm'uee will hold a mass --^mg , °" .J^V^m
evening, December 18- the date on which Tiots^) s^erm
?)^ei:i?o1"T08^'^:^Srd"str?et?"su^rne L FoUette will
16
SOCIALIST APPEAL
be chairman and Norman Thomas one of the principal
^^Contributions for the work of the Committee can be
.;ent to its office at Room 921, 22 E. 17th Street, N.Y.C.
NEC ENDORSES COMMITTEE
The following resolution was passed by the National
Executive Committee of the Socialist Party at its recent
session in New York City:
The work of the Provisional American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky be endorsed by the NFC
That a sub-committee of the NEC be appointed to co-
operate with the above committee in representations to
the Norv/eg'ian government asking it (1) to extend to
Trotsky the full rights of asylum; and (2) to co-operate
with any responsible commission of inquire Vvhich may
be established to investigate the facts regarding the
charges made against Trotsky and his answer thereto.
Socialist Appeal Association
THE SOCl'ALIST APPEAL is no longer an organ of
a few individual comrades. The role it plays at pre-
sent as the organ of revolutionary socialism and its con-
stantly widening influence made it imperative that it be
taken' out of the hands of a small group and be placed
under the control of all of the comrades throughout the
country who support the principles which the APPEAL
has enunciated in its pages. And in addition to that factor
it is esential that the APPEAL increase the frequency of
its appearance, extend its circulation and augment its
influence. That can be done only if the hundreds of com-
rades who support it organize themselves into an Asso-
ciation the purpose of which is to strengthen the APPEAL
financially and in other ways and thus help educate the
members of the party as well as the advanced workers in
general in the principles of revolutionary Marxism.
With all this in mind a goodly number of left wing com-
rades of Chicago met and organized the SOCIALIST
APPEAL ASSOCIATION. Only members of the Socialist
partv and Y.P.S.L. are eligible for membership in the
APPEAL ASSOCIATION. The action committee of the
ASSOCIATION has been instructed to ask all comrades
throughout the country who sympathize with the aims
of the SOCIALIST APPEAL to join the ASSOCIATION
and show their support of the APPEAL in a concrete
manner. We advise all comrades of one center who be-
come members of the APPEAL ASSOCIATION to or-
ganize themselves, meet and discuss methods for im-
proving the form and contents of the APPEAL and devise
means for increasing its circulation. As soon as practic-
able, depending on the number of comrades joining the
ASSOCIATION, a conference will be called officially to
decide upon the future policies of the APPEAL and to
elect, in a democratic manner, a new editorial board.
Membership dues are one dollar per year, a small enough
sura to enable every comrade who agrees with the general
policies of the APPEAL to join the ASSOCIATION. The
Just Published
The Moscow Trials
MAX SHACHTMAN
The Civil War in Spain
BY FELIX MORROW
PIONEER PUBLISHERS
100 FIFTH AVE., N.Y.C.
money collected will be used of course to defray the
costs of publishing the APPEAL.
No revolutionary .Socialist should delav a single day
in joining the APPEAL ASSOCIATION. It is to be taken
for granted that a comrade need not agree v/ith every
article thus far published in the APPEAL in order to
join the ASSOCIATION. There will be plenty of dif-
ferences of opinion amongst the members. If you are in
agreement with the general aims and approach of the
APPEAL as indicated especially in its editorials and in
the general character of the articles there is nothing for
you to do but join the APPEAL ASSOCIATION.
Send your application and your dollar to
SOCIALIST APPEAL
Room 719 — 35 S. Dearborn St.
Chicago, 111.
SEMI-MONTHLY
The immediate task of the ASSOCIATION will be to""
assure the publication o^ the APPEAL as a semi-monthly.
At first we went on the theory that before commencing
publication of the APPEAL twice a month it would be
necessary to have a sustaining fund of two hundred dol-
lars per month. We are frank enough to state that we
have not received that amount in monthly pledges,
lot of figuring (and not too hopeful figuring) has con-
vinced us that if the comrades raise a fund of five hundred
dollars we shall be in a position to start the semi-monthly
immediately. There is a good chance that we begin
publishing the semi-monthly in January of next year. We
do not make that as a definite promise. We shall cer-
tainly be surprised and disappointed if the first issues of
the semi-monthly will not be out by March.
With so many inner party problems to discuss it may
be found necessary to make one of the two issues per
month an issue for party members only. Especially with
a convention of the party confronting us will it be neces-
sary to publish much material which it would be inadvis-
able to print in a public organ.
All this depends upon the financial support of the com-
rades interested in building the party into a revolutionary
instrument. LIASTE IS NECESSARY. SEND IN YOUR
CONTRIBUTIONS AND PLEDGES.
SOCIALIST APPEAL
EDITORIAL BOARD
Ernest Erber - Albert Goldman - Rudolph C. 01»on
Business Mgrr-
RUDOLPH C OLSON
Room 719—35 S. Dearborn St. Chicago, IlL
Subscription Rates: one dollar for 24 issues; fifty
cents for twelve issues.
Bundle Orders — Five or More — Three Cents per Copy
NOTICE OUR NEW ADDRESS— Room 719—35 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET, CHICAGO. ILL.